The agriculture chapter addresses structural barriers to trade and will support a dramatic expansion of U.S. food, agricultural and seafood exports, increase U.S. farm and fishery incomes, generate more rural activity, and boost job growth. A large number of non-tariff barriers to U.S. agriculture and seafood products are addressed, including meat and poultry, seafood, rice, dairy products, infant formula, horticultural products, animal feed and feed additives, pet food, and agricultural biotechnology products. The dependence of the Phase One deal on massive purchase commitments from China could be its biggest mistake. These commitments often generate press releases about the big sales that are coming, but the deal has not done enough for what was really needed: lower tariffs and other trade barriers to allow producers to compete with the Chinese market. If trade liberalization had been at the centre of the agreement and not just the small part that was, the long-term results might have been better. Trump`s complaints about Chinese imports have historically focused on manufacturing, which accounts for 70 percent of the goods covered by the purchase obligations.4 Among the complaints were (among others) China`s large trade surpluses on goods, increased tariffs on cars, the strength of U.S. companies to hand over their technology and production to China instead of exporting from the U.S., and subsidies to sectors such as steel and aluminium. this would crowd U.S. companies out of export markets. 2.
On July 6, 2018, the Trump administration imposed its first tariffs on $34 billion worth of Chinese goods. At the same time, China retaliated. The two countries imposed tariffs until September 2019 on a total of more than $450 billion in bilateral trade. The January 2020 agreement applies to U.S. exports of goods and services. In the absence of detailed data on high-frequency trading for services, these bonds are not valued here. The 86-page agreement facilitates criminal proceedings in China against those accused of stealing trade secrets. It contains provisions to prevent Chinese government officials from applying administrative and regulatory procedures to detect foreign companies` trade secrets and pass this information into the hands of Chinese competitors. From the beginning, an additional $200 billion in additional sales to China was a worrying target. Nearly 30 percent of U.S. exports to China are not even covered by the Phase One agreement.
And for those who covered the deal, a review of 15 product groups shows that their sales to China have been influenced by a number of factors, including plane crashes, outbreaks, export controls, World Trade Organization (WTO) court rulings, the persistent impact of trade war tariffs, and the pandemic. China bought $130 billion in U.S. goods and $56 billion in services in 2017, before the trade war began, as U.S. data shows. The government acknowledges that the agreement does not leave an answer to some U.S. complaints, including how the Chinese government subsidizes its companies. This is the concern that was expressed when Trump unleashed a trade war in July 2018 by imposing tariffs on Chinese imports. One conclusion of the data is obvious. Americans suffered when China`s retaliation devastated U.S. exports.
Trump`s tariff hike has raised prices for U.S. consumers and costs for U.S. businesses. Its politically motivated purchase commitments may have created more problems than they have been solved. After the election, the US will need a new approach to solving its trade problems with China. Read the nearly 100-page trade agreement between the United States. And China Nevertheless, Washington`s Phase 1 agreement leaves no solution to fundamental differences with Beijing, which depends on massive state intervention in the economy to make China a technological power. The deal brings into force tariffs on Chinese imports worth about $360 billion, which the government hopes will generate future concessions. . . .